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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELBERT G. BENNETT and MARJORIE C. 
BENNETT, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ARNOLD DEE WHITE and ERMA M. ) 
WHITE, his wife, and GENERAL ) 
INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a ) 
corporation, ) 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
__________________________ > 
GENERAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ELBERT G. BENNETT and MARJORIE C. 
BENNETT, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
} 
) 
____________________________ .) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
CASE NO. 9633. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Appellants instituted an equity action seek-
ing rescission of a construction contract upon the 
ground of fraud, and restitution of moneys paid 
thereunder. 
Prior to the institution of this action the 
General Investment Corporation, as assignee of 
-1-
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Respondents, filed suit against the Appellants for 
the unpaid balance due under the contract assigned. 
Pursuant to stipulation, the General Investment 
Corporation agreed to abide the outcome of Appel-
lants' rescission action, to the effect that a final 
decree for Appellants in said action would also 
operate in their favor in the prior suit. Con-
versely, if Respondents prevailed, jud~ent would 
be entered in favor of General Investment for the 
amount stipulated as a deficiency under the contract. 
Consequently, the rescission action was the 
only one of the two suits which was brought to 
trial. Throughout this brief "Appellants" will 
refer to the Bennetts, plaintiffs in said action, 
and "Respondents" will refer to the defendants, 
Arnold and Erma White. 
Fraud was alleged in two counts. First, 
that White obtained Appellants' signature to a 
building agreement prior to substantial comple-
tion upon his representation that he would com-
plete, and that at the time he had no intention 
-2-
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of completing the construction. Secondly, that 
White fraudulently represented that he would carry 
the contract for three and one-half years without 
obligating Appellants to deal with any financial 
institution. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before an advisory jury. 
Special interrogatories were submitted to the jury, 
all of which were answered in favor of Appellants. 
(R. 381-82). Respondents moved the Court for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the trial 
court, refusing to accept the findings of the jury 
dealing with White's intent, granted the motion. 
Judgment was entered in favor of Respond-
ents of no cause of action. In the companion case, 
judgment was entered against Appellants in favor of 
General Investment Corporation for the sum of 
$2,568.39. The Court denied Appellants' motion 
for a new trial. 
-3-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment 
and judgment in their favor as a matter of law, or 
that failing, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A serious dispute exists between the parties 
as to the facts of this case. Consequently, in 
order to enable the Court to properly evaluate 
the merits, both sides will be stated. As this is 
an equity action, the Court may evaluate the evi-
dence and may set aside the findings of the trial 
court if not supported by the weight of the evidence. 
Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P. 2d 142. 
A. Respondents' Factual Contention. 
The record, pleadings and all other docu-
ments on file herein, clearly indicate that Respond-
ents regard this case as a clear-cut instance of a 
hard-to-please buyer, seeking by any means to avoid 
obligations, legitimately incurred, on the basis of 
-4-
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mere whim. Their contentions appear to be summed up 
accurately as follows: 
The Bennetts approached Mr. White in June of 
1960 and paid him $2,000.00 down to build a $30,000.00 
house. Mr. White made no promises or representations 
that he would carry the contract once the house was 
completed, merely indicating that he would try, and 
at all times complied with the Bennetts• request to 
furnish specifications so they would have some idea 
as to the general plan of construction and the 
materials used therein as the building progressed. 
It was agreed that the home would be con-
structed according to plans picked out by the Bennetts, 
but that certain minor changes could be made, with 
adjustments in the final price to be made at the 
date of completion. 
The Bennetts moved into the home around 
October 25, 1960, at which time only minor elements 
of construction had not been completed. At the time 
the final contract was signed, Mr. White agreed that 
he would complete the work to be done and fully 
-5-
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intended to do so. All work not completed at the 
signing of the contract was of a minor nature and 
J , 
in addition, all changes from the original plans 
had been agreed upon, and a price adjustment had 
been made. (De£. 5.). Furthermore, says Mr. White, 
at the time the final contract was signed on October25, 
1960, he had informed the Bennetts that he was not 
holding the contract on the house, but had already 
made arrangements to assign same to the General 
Invesbment Corporation. 
A few days after the contract was signed, 
the Bennetts telephoned and informed White, quite 
unreasonably, that they did not intend to stay in 
the house, and complained of some minor failures to 
complete construction. Mr. White, acting as an honor-
able man, attempted on many occasions to complete 
the minor items of construction, but for one month 
was unable to do so because the Bennetts were never 
home. By White's own testimony (R. 186) and Defend-
ants' Exhibit 5 taken in conjunction therewith, all 
deviations from the original plans had been agreed 
-6-
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upon and an adjustment in price made, some in favor 
of White, others in favor of the Bennetts. 
B. Appellants' View of the Facts. 
The facts, as viewed by Appellants, may 
be summarized as follows: 
Mr. White, representing himself as fin-
ancially responsible, (R.262) agreed to place Appel-
lants in a home, the original cost of which was to 
be $24,500.00, for a downpayment of $2,000.00. In 
order to accomplish the consummation of such an 
agreement, Mr. White represented that he would carry 
the contract personally for three and one-half years. 
This representation was made necessary in view of 
Appellants' representation that they would not in-
cur such an obligation if the debt was to be con-
trolled by any financial institution. (R. 264). 
In order to induce Appellants to enter into the 
obligation, White made collateral statements of 
facts relating to his financial ability to carry 
the contract. (R. 262). He stated, in answer to 
Mr. Bennett's question as to his reasons for being 
-7-
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such a good samaritan, that he was "one of three 
contractors in the city who could afford to" carry 
a contract for a home purchaser. These representa-
tions were made after Mr. Bennett informed him that 
he would not assume such a large obligation if the 
contract in his name was to be held by a financial 
institution. Furthermore, Mr. White lulled the 
Appellants into a false sense of security through-
out by his constant assurances that he personally 
was going to carry the contract for three and one-
half years. 
Not only did White induce Appellants to enter 
the construction agreement by this promise, but he 
utilized it for the purpose of asserting his will 
throughout in matters relating to material elements 
of construction. For example, he insisted that the 
kitchen cabinets be of a material which he claimed 
would promote the resale value if he wa.s ever stuck 
with the house. (R. 270). 
He represented to Mr. Bennett that the 
latter's fear over the condition of a second bathroom 
-8-
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being too small, and that he would prefer to remove 
the adjoining partitions thereby resulting in only 
one large room, were of no consequence, as he was 
really the one who had to concern himself with the 
proper construction, looking to resale value in the 
event he had to take over the home. (R. 273). As 
will be seen, when testimony showed that the second 
bath turned out to be a constructional farce, a 
comedy of errors, Mr. White blatantly laid this at 
Mr. Bennett's door, saying that the latter insisted 
that the shaving mirror be placed over the logical 
spot, the washbowl. (R. 184). The record shows 
that the mirror had to be placed over a window on a 
swivel hinge, in order to be over the washbowl, and 
that the only other spot that it could have been 
located would have been on a wall area over the 
toilet. (R. 284). Mr. White claims that this was 
at Mr. Bennett's insistence. In other words, Mr. 
Bennett is to be blamed for the constructional 
error of a man who claims to have been building 
homes for over seventeen years! (R. 150). This 
-9-
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supposedly temporary situation was never corrected 
once Respondent obtained the signed contract. 
By White's own testimony it is clear that 
he realized there was more work to be done on the 
home at the time the contract of October 25, 1960, 
was signed. (R. 191). He claims that the floor of 
the lower level was completely finished and that 
there was nothing further to be done in this regard. 
Yet an analysis of the plans of the house which Mr. 
White agreed to follow, unless changed by mutual 
agreement, clearly shows that a cement floor with 
floor drain was contemplated. (De£. 1). That this 
omission was not a "minor" element of construction 
is established by White's own testimony. He 
stated that to follow the plan would have cost 
"thousands of dollars more." (R. 213-14). Yet he 
later states with amazing inconsistency that he did 
not impose an extra charge for the wood floor he 
substituted. (R. 214). He insists in any event 
that he received the Bennetts' permission to make 
the substitution. Yet by his own exhibit, 
-10-
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purportedly containing all adjustments made as build-
ing progressed, there is no indication that this 
change was agreed upon nor that the Bennetts re-
ceived any credit for the "thousands of dollars" 
White saved by his unilateral decision to depart 
from the plan. (Def. 5). (Both the plans and speci-
fications introduced as Def. 1 clearly show concrete 
was called for.) 
Mr. White attempts to lightly dismiss this 
gross departure from his agreement by insisting at 
one stage of the trial that the floor he put in was 
much better and cost much more than that demanded by 
his own plans and specifications. (R. 178). (The 
latter statement being grossly inconsistent with 
the later remark that the plan called for would 
cost thousands more if followed.) 
Even if one could assume that the floor put 
in by White was usable, as he contends, where the 
feature of construction constituted a material part 
of the home, it is not the law that the party repre-
senting that the construction will be completed 
-11-
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according to plan, with no intention of doing so, can 
foist his choice upon the other party merely to save 
a substantial sum of money for himself. The princi-
ple is stated in Austin v. Duggan, 162 Cal. App. 2d 
580, 328 P. 2d 224, 226, quoting from an earlier de-
cision also dealing with a fraud-rescission situation, 
"The representee can rescind where he 
obtains something substantially different 
from that which he was led to expect. If 
one is induced to buy a certain lot of land 
by misrepresentation that it contains a vine-
yard, he need not keep it when he learns that 
it contains instead an apple orchard; even 
though the lot of land is the eventual lot of 
land and although the orchard may be more 
valuable than the vineyard which he expected 
to get, it is obviously unfair to require him 
to keep what he did not bargain for and did 
not want." 
But the facts do not show that the floor, 
knowingly substituted by White, was anything near 
the quality that the Bennetts had the right to ex-
pect under the agreement. 
Appellants' testimony was that the entire 
surface was rough and splintery, with wide cracks 
between boards allowing cold air to rush in from 
the excavation below. (R. 280, 282). In brief it 
-12-
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rendered the lower level uninhabitable. White's 
testimony is directly contradictory, stating that 
it was a fine floor that anyone would be pleased to 
have in lieu of that specified in the plans. (R. 194). 
The conflict in this testimony is resolved in 
favor of Appellants by one of White's own exhibits, 
a letter to him from the State Department of Con-
tractors directing him to cover the entire lower 
level floor with one-quarter inch plywood. (Def. 8). 
In order to believe White's testimony one 
must conclude that the Board of Contractors, arbi-
trarily and unreasonably, has developed a compul-
sive mania, whereby all fine floors must be covered 
with plywood. It is more logical to infer that the 
flooring was grossly inadequate. 
In any event, this was accomplished after, 
not before the Bennetts moved out, and was obviously 
done at the insistence of the Board of Contractors 
and not by any desire of White to fulfill his agree-
ment. Even if this change had been made previously, 
the plywood covering necessary to comply with the 
- 13 -
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minimum building requirements of the Board did not 
satisfy the plans and specifications which White was 
required to adhere to. From his actions and testi-
mony it is clear also that White had no intention 
of completing this substantial element of construc-
tion as promised at the signing of the October 25 
agreement. 
With regard to White's promise to carry the 
contract personally, he insists that he merely 
changed his mind. In any event, he claims that the 
Bennetts were informed of this change of plan at 
the time Mr. Homer Jenson of General Investment 
visited the prendses prior to October 25. Mr. 
Jenson, whose interests in this suit are directly 
opposed to that of the Bennetts, could not recall 
that the Bennetts were so informed. (R. 235). 
Futhermore, this is verified by the pleadings in 
the case, where General Investment's answer to the 
Appellants' complaint states that notification of 
the assignment was made after the contract was 
signed on October 25. (R. 29). 
-14-
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Two facts stand out with regard to White's 
promise not to assign. First, it is clear that if 
he again promised to hold the contract at the sign-
ing of October 25, as Appellants maintain, he had 
no intention of doing so inasmuch as Mr. Jenson and 
White both testified the arrangements to assign had 
been made prior to that date. (R. 233). Indeed, 
the assignment was made the following day. (R. 237, 
286). 
Furthermore, directly contradictory to 
White's testimony to the effect that he could not 
recall ever making such promise, other than possi-
bly at the original meeting with the Bennetts, is 
the testimony of Mrs. Thomas, an individual having 
no interest in the home whatsoever, nor testify-
ing as an employee or relative of either party. 
(R. 323). 
The Appellants' testimony indicates that, 
in spite of Mr. White's assertion that he attempted 
to complete the home after October 25 and before 
November 25, when rescission was effected, nothing 
-15-
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was done in that regard. Both Mrs. Bennett and Mrs. 
Thomas testified that about two weeks before the 
Bennetts moved out, White stated that he would have 
to be sued in order to get any more work out of him. 
(R. 324, 331). That he meant what he said is veri-
fied by the fact that he complied only with the 
orders of the Board of Contractors, and made no 
effort to comply with the plans and specifications as 
per his obligation. Further, what work he did do 
was accomplished after notice of rescission was 
served. (R. J31). 
The record is replete with other elements in-
dicating White's failure to complete his obligations 
under the contract. Cabinets were rough and unfin-
ished, the work around windows was unfinished allow-
ing wind to come into the lower level, the stairway 
was flimsy and unsafe and numerous other omission 
were present. (R. 280-83). While any one or two 
of these items may be of little consequence in and 
of themselves, taken as a whole they indicate the 
lack of interest White had in his obligation once 
-16-
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the agreement was signed, in spite of his promise 
to complete, and are relevant in determining his 
intent. 
Admittedly the Bennetts moved into the 
house before it was completed. This was necessary 
because of the expiration of the lease at their 
former residence. (R. 279). Their signing of the 
agreement before completion was accomplished as a 
courtesy to Mr. White in whom they had been lulled 
to trust implicitly. They relied on his representa-
tions and prc·mses. They were, as Mr. Bennett testi-
fied, probably foolish in their reliance on White's 
word. This reliance, however, did not spring from 
a general gullibility toward the human race in gen-
eral. It was carefully developed and nurtured by 
White himself. (R. 284, 332). He asked for and re-
ceived the confidence and trust of the Bennetts and 
then, when he had his paper signed, he cashed in 
and in effect, told them to "go fly a kite." 
The Appellants contend that in view of the 
facts developed at trial, the court erred in refusing 
-17-
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to accept the findings of the jury to the effect 
that: 
(a) On November 25, 1960, the day on 
which plaintiffs served their notice of re-
scission upon defendants, White left features 
of the construction contract unfinished to 
the extent that the house was then substan-
tially not completed. 
(b) On October 25, 1960, at the time 
the final contract was signed by the parties, 
White dj.d not then intend to substantially 
complete the contract. 
(c) Between October 25, 1960, and November 
25, 1960, White stated to plaintiffs that he 
did not intend to do any more work on the 
house. (R. 109). 
The trial court refused to accept only the 
second finding of the jury as to the intent of White 
at the time the final contract was signed. Accord-
ingly, it may be assumed that the other findings 
stand, ~., that the home was not substantially 
-18-
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complete at the time of rescission and that White 
informed the Bennetts prior thereto, but after the 
contract was signed, that he did not intend to com-
plete the home. 
It is asserted by Appellants that the trial 
court was acting under a misconception of the law in 
refusing the jury findings with respect to White's 
lack of intention to complete the home at the time 
the October 25th contract was signed. Further, it 
is urged that the trial court erred in its refusal 
to cons) der m.:.e cau.-:;e of action stated by Ap;,ellants 
relating to White's promises to hold the contract 
for three and one-half years. Finally, Appellants 
wish to point out that the finding of the jury to 
the effect that the contract was not substantially 
complet~1 at the ti~e of rescission was clearly war-
ranted by the evidence, and that the trial court 
found no fault with this finding. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE JURY 
FINDINGS RELATING TO WHITE'S INTENT WAS BASED 
UPON A MISCONCEPTION OF LAW. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The memorandum decision of the trial court 
clearly reveals that if the law of the State of Utah 
is correctly stated therein, no action based upon 
fraud in this State will ever be successfully prose-
cuted in the absence of a confession in open court. 
The following statement of the trial court illus-
trates this fact: 
"There was no direct evidence that 
defendant ••• intended not to complete his 
contract when he signed and thereby cove-
nanted to finish the work to be done on 
the house. rhere were circumstances 
provec5. from_ which inferences could be_ 
drawn, Appr-1rently the jury drew inL;:--
ences and concluded that at the time of 
nignit~g the final contract Mr. White 
clearly had in his mind the intention 
and determination not to perform the 
extra work agreed upon to finish the 
~." (R. 115). 
Two glaring errors are revealed in the court's 
stateme.!:.i:. First the "extra" work referred to above 
was not extra in any sense of the word. It was 
work which White had unconditionally promised and 
agreed to perform at the inception of the agreement. 
Secondly, the court admits that proven cir-
cumstances enabled the jury to draw inferences of 
-20-
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White's intent, but holds as a matter of law that 
such inferences are not warTanted, or to be con-
sidered, in the light of respondents' direct testi-
mony of his honest intentions. We submit that such 
has never been the law in this or any other juris-
diction. 
The correct rule was aptly stated in 
Connolly v. Gishwiller, 162 F.2d 428, 433 (7th Cir., 
1947) (cert. denied 332 U.S. 825) as follows: 
"Fraud, in its general sense, com-
prise:::; all '3.·-:ts, omissions and conceal-
ments invol',~tng a breach of legal or 
ecr~itable d·uty, trust or confidence and 
resulting in damage to another ••• ~ 
rarely susceptible ~f direct proof, but 
must ordinarily be established by circum-
stantial evidence and legitimate infer-
ences arising therefrom, which taken as a 
whole will show the fraudulent intent or 
purpose with which the party acted. The 
inferences to be gathered from a chain 
of circumstances depend largely upon the 
common sense knowledge of the motives 
and intentions of men in like circum-
stances." 
The Court further erred in assuming that the 
"one parcel of evidence" upon which Appellants rely 
as indicative of White's intent is that on the day 
after the signing Mr. White assigned the contract 
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to General Investment Corporation. (R. 116). Al-
though Appellants do indeed consider this to be ex-
tremely relevant in laying bare the deceitful machi-
nations of White, a more potent example of his state 
of mind may be found in the proven fact that White 
did not intend to substantially complete the lower 
level of the home according to the plans and speci-
fications. This is not an inference; it was admitted 
by White. It is an established fact. He attempted 
to explain this action upon the ground that it would 
cost him "thousands of dollars more" to abide by his 
agreement. (R. 213-14). He can point to nothing 
in his own prepared statement of "agreed upon" 
changes whereby the Bennetts either consented to 
such change or were given credit for the "thousands 
of dollars" White admittedly saved himself by his 
unilateral abandonment of the plans and specifica-
tions he was committed to follow. (Def. 1). 
The trial court further concluded that the 
fact of respondents' non-performance is not to be 
considered in determining the intent of the latter. 
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We do not contest the principle that mere failure to 
observe a promise, standing alone, cannot justify a 
finding of fraud. However, the law does not take 
the narrow view of the trial court. Quite the con-
trary, although the failure to perform a promise is 
not sufficient to sustain an allegation of fraud 
standing alone, yet the non-observance of the pro-
mise may, when considered with other evidence be 
sufficient. Charpentier v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 
91 N.H. 38, 13 A. 2d 141. And the fact that a de-
fendent in a fraud action fails to perform a pro-
mise is consistent with the assertion that he did 
not intend to do so at the time the promise was made. 
~ v. Anderson, 198, Okla. 304, 178 P.2d 78.. In 
short, if the only evidence of White's fraudulent 
intent consisted of his failure to observe a pro-
mise, the Appellants would not be before this Court. 
The jury, obviously considering the evidence as a 
whole, returned a finding of fraudulent intent on 
the part of Mr. White. The trial court obviously 
refused to consider the evidence as a whole, the 
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unusual way in which White performed his agreement, 
the failure to furnish Appellants with specifica-
tions, (R. 332) his utilizing his promise to carry 
the contract to assert his will in matters of con-
struction, his arrangements for the assignment of 
the contract before the final signing, all the while 
representing to Appellants that he would not do so, 
as well as the fact that he refused to do any more 
work which he was admittedly obligated to do until 
compelled by the Board of Contractors. In this regard 
it is also relevant as showing his fraudulent scheme 
existed from the beginning to point out that he 
charged the Bennetts $200.00 for a commission, paid 
to himself on the sale of the lot, plus adding his 
margin thereto, in effect resulting in a price of 
$7,090.00 for a lot he would have sold them for 
$6,500.00 if not built upon. (De£. 7) (R. 252-54). 
In short, the Court ignored the. principle which 
states that in a fraud case an unusual way of doing 
business may represent an indicia of fraud under the 
circumstances. Allison v. Mildred, (1957) 307 S.W. 
2d 447. 
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The finding of the jury, in answering the 
third interrogatory submitted, clearly indicates 
that White intended, and informed the Bennetts that 
he so intended, not to finish the agreed upon work. 
Such subsequent conduct and statements by White are 
clearly relevant in determining whether the fraudu-
lent intent existed at the time the promise was 
made. Foster v. ~, 51, N.D. 581, 199 N.W. 1017. 
Referring again to the memorandum decision of 
the trial court (R. 118), it is indicated that the 
trial judge believes the law to be to the effect 
that when a transaction is susceptible of two con-
structions, the one free from imputation of fraud 
must be adopted. This contention was made on appeal 
in Gordon v. Slate, 169 Okla. 381, 37 P.2d 270, 272. 
Nevertheless, the Court affirmed a finding of fraud 
based upon circumstantial evidence, and in that 
regard stated: 
"Circumstances altogether inconclu-
sive, if separately considered, may, by 
their number and joint operation, especi-
ally when corroborated by moral coinci-
dences, be sufficient to constitute con-
clusive proof of fraud." 
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Finally, in this regard, the trial court in-
dicated that the interests of witnesses in the out-
come were of about equal weight. (R. 118). The 
testimony of Mrs. Thomas, indicating a discrepancy 
in White's self-serving declarations, appears to 
have been disregarded, at least by the trial court 
if not the jury. vJhen such material evidence (testi-
mony of Mrs. Thomas shedding light on the credibility 
of White, (R. 318-25) is excluded or not given con-
sideration, the findings of the trial court lose the 
weight normally attributed to it in an equity case. 
Allison v. Mildred, (1957) 307 s.w. 2d 447. Further-
more, under the same principle, the findings of the 
trial court, as substituted for those of the jury, 
should be considered in an even more suspicious 
light when it becomes clear that the admissions of 
White, himself, to the effect that he did not intend 
to complete the lower level according to plans and 
specifications because of the additional cost to 
him of "thousands of dollars," were completely dis-
regarded by the Court. This is the "direct" evidence 
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of intent the Court complains Appellants failed to 
produce. It comes directly from the mouth of re-
spondent! Yet it is completely disregarded. 
It is submitted that the trial court mis-
construed the law relating to proof of fraud and, 
in addition, that it failed to take into considera-
tion material evidence establishing Appellants' 
right to rescind as a matter of law. 
One final example clearly indicates the 
trial court mdsinterpreted certain testimony. The 
Court stated that Mrs. Bennett testified the home 
was a "luxury dwelling." The record shows that she 
stated in effect it "was to be a luxury dwelling." 
(R. 337). 
Taking all of the foregoing factors, pro-
positions of law, testimony, and deductions of the 
trial court into consideration, it is submitted 
that the findings of the jury more clearly repre-
sent a responsible and accurate analysis of the 
evidence which unfolded during the course of the 
trial than those upon which the trial court based 
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its judgment below. Accordingly, we submit that 
the judgment should be reversed as a matter of law. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT 
APPELLANTS' THEORY OF THE CASE TO THE JURY 
ON THE ISSUE OF WHITE'S FRAUDULENT PROMISE 
TO CARRY THE CONTRACT AND IN FAILING TO 
CONSIDER SAID ISSUE AS A GROUND FOR RESCIS-
SION. 
In the second count of their amended com• 
plaint, (R. 8-9), Appellants asserted a cause of 
action based upon White's fraudulent promise to per-
sonally carry the final contract for a four-year 
period. Evidence was taken from which the fact 
finder may well have found that, at the time the 
final contract was signed, White again asserted this 
promise with no intention of performing. In fact, 
the evidence clearly shows that he had already made 
arrangements for the assignment before the agree-
ment was executed. 
By refusing to give Appellants Instruction 
No. 4, the trial court indicated that no consider-
ation was given to this aspect of Appellants' case. 
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(R. 81). The testimony of the Bennetts, supported 
by that of Mrs. Thomas, (R. 323) establishes that 
White continuously asserted that he would carry the 
contract. Indeed both Appellants testified that the 
contract would not have been entered into by them but 
for this representation. Furthermore, their testi-
mony indicates the false sense of security Appel-
lants were lulled into by White's repeated repre-
sentations of his honesty and sincerity of purpose, 
which, taken in conjunction with his promise to 
carry the contract himself, allowed him to build 
without furnishing specifications, and to increase 
the initial proposed estimate of the cost after he 
had received the downpayment of $2,000.00. The fact 
finder should take into consideration the differ-
ence in building experience and the degree of con-
fidence placed in the seller by a buyer of real 
estate when faced with a question of fraud. ~ 
v. ~, 2 Utah 2d. 101, 269 P.2d 865. 
Two possibilities might be advanced for the 
refusal of the trial court to consider this aspect 
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of Appellants• case. First, the Court may have 
considered the representation to lack materiality. 
If so, an obvious error was made. The applicable 
rule is stated in the Restatement of Torts, § 538, 
as follows: 
"(1) Reliance upon a fraudulent mis-
representation of fact in a business trans-
action is justifiable if, but only if, the 
fact represented is material. 
"(2) A fact is material if ••• (b) the 
maker of the representation knows that its 
recipient is likely to regard the fact as 
important although a reasonable man would 
not so regard it." 
Appellants made it clear to White that they 
would not build at the time except for his promise 
to carry the contract. (R. 285, 335). This clearly 
made the representation a material one under the Re-
statement test. 
Nor is it an answer to say that White 
changed his mind. Although in some instances, a 
promise to perform in the future, if broken, does 
not constitute actionable fraud. 
"/_j/f the promise is accompanied with 
statements of existing facts which show the 
-30-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ability of the promissor to perform his 
promise, and without which the promise 
would not be accepted or acted upon, such 
statements are denominated representations, 
and if falsely made are grounds for avoid-
ing the contract though the thing promised 
to be done lies wholly in the future." 
Russ Lumber & Mill Co. v. Muscupiabe Land & 
Water Co., 120 Cal. 521, 52 Pac. 995. 
The Russ Lumber theory is clearly applicable 
in the case at bar. White not only promised to 
carry the contract personally, but represented as a 
presently existing fact his financial position which 
made him one of three contractors in the city who 
could afford to make such an offer. As White's pro-
mise was a continuing one, reaffirmed at the October 
25 signing, his statement that he was forced to 
assign in order to meet his obligations (R. 215) 
clearly highlights the falsity of his prior state-
ments concerning his financial picture. 
A second possibility for the trial court's 
complete disregard of this theory of the case might 
be based upon the idea that, even if substantially 
all of the elements of fraud were present, there 
was no damage suffered by Appellants. In short, 
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they were in the same position whether White or 
General Investment was carrying the contract. 
One of the witnesses called by Appellants, 
Mr. Snarr, was a former F.H.A. inspector. He was 
not allowed to testify as to the fact whether or 
not the house, as it stood, would qualify for F.H.A. 
financing. (R. 247). As the Appellants would be 
required to refinance in four years' time, it was 
important that this means of financing be available 
to them. Secure in the thought that White would 
have some stake in the house for four years and 
would be interested in the Appellants obtaining the 
necessary financing, they let him proceed with con-
struction without specifications or accounting to 
them in any way. They knew, or believed, that if 
any difficulty came up over this at a later date, 
he would make it right. If the testimony of Mr. 
Snorr had been allowed, and if it had been to the 
effect that F.H.A. would never finance the home as 
built it would be difficult to conceive how one , 
could say that the fraudulent promise, and their 
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reliance thereon, had not caused Appellants serious 
injury and damage. 
In connection with the damage question, it 
is submitted that a finding of actual monetary dam-
age is not absolutely essential to allow rescission 
based upon fraud. As pointed out in Earl v. Saks & 
~' 36 Cal.2d 602, 226, P.2d 340, there is a dis-
agreement among authorities as to what is meant by 
"injury" which will justify a rescission. It need 
not be a pecuniary loss but merely a showing that 
the injured party did not get substantially what he 
bargained for. 
The situation is closely analogous to those 
cases collected in 48 Harv. L. Rev. 480, 485, wherein 
rescission was allowed, with respect to transactions 
induced by an agent's misrepresentation of his 
principal's identity, even though there was no 
economic reason for the unwillingness to deal with 
the principal. The Bennetts agreed to buy if their 
dealing would be with White. They did not wish to 
deal with General Investment. 
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We submit that by means of his promise, 
White was able to obtain a signed contract, assign 
same and obtain his money and then literally walk 
off the job. The substantially uncompleted home, as 
found by the jury (this finding was not rejected by 
the trial court) certainly establishes sufficient 
damage to Appellants to justify rescission. To say 
that Appellants should have sued for damages, when 
White himself admitted the home could not have been 
made whole without the expenditure of additional 
"thousands of dollars" would be a ridiculous conten-
tion. Appellants waited nearly one month for White 
to perform before rescinding and by waiting longer 
would, by ratification, have lost their right to 
rescind. Indeed, the General Investment Corporation 
in its answer, indicates that by waiting two weeks 
they had ratified the contract and were relegated to 
a suit for damages. (R. 29). 
As stated in the ~ case, ~, there is, 
in many cases, a strong social interest in not having 
one intentionally take advantage of another, an 
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interest which at times overrides the social inter-
est in the stability of transactions even though 
no economic loss was suffered. 
In the case at bar there was a clear econ-
omic loss, a home that was not substantially com-
plete, a home not built according to agreed upon 
plans because the builder would have been forced 
to spend thousands of dollars more than he antici-
pated. In addition to the wilful failure to com-
plete the home, the case also involves fraudulent 
representations, known to be material to the sub-
jective mind of the buyers, with no intention at all 
on the seller's part of complying therewith. 
The law and social policy condemn this type 
of sharp and fraudulent practice. To allow the 
trial court's judgment to stand will be a green 
light to those dealing with the public to make the 
grossest of representations and, if they are persua-
sive and capable of gaining the trust and confidence 
of those with whom they deal, take their money and 
leave them sadder but wiser as they reap their 
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~---~~~, ~~nt~nt with the thought that their vic-
tim is stuck with his bargain. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit for the reasons stated herein 
that the Court should reverse the judgment and 
direct the Court to enter judgment in favor of the 
Appellants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELBERT G. BENNETT and 
MARJORIE C. BENNET, 
pro !,! 
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